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RECENT DECISIONS
ADMIRALTY-COLLISION-DUTY OF THIRD VESSEL TO

GIVE

wARNING-

washington,

a private merchantman proceeding north at night through a
large United States Navy formation steaming west, received no warning
from formation commanders that Ruchamkin, an escort, was rejoining
from the east. Uninformed of Washington's presence and ordered to resume station expeditiously, Ruchamkin entered the formation at high speed.
Despite late radical maneuvers upon discovery of Washington close aboard,
Ruchamkin was struck by the latter's bow with resulting damage to both
ships. On reciprocal libels, held, decree for Washington's owner. In addition to Ruchamkin's failure to anticipate Washington, the United States
was negligent in that the formation commanders made no effective effort
to caution Washington of the imminent peril created by Ruchamkin's
obedience to their orders. The Ruchamkin, (E.D. Va. 1956) 141 F. Supp. 97.
Waiver of federal immunity to suit for damage caused by a public
vessel1 is today understood to encompass not only actions in which the
public vessel is a physical instrument of harm, but also those in which
injury results from negligent conduct on the part of ship's personnel in the
vessel's operation2 or possession,3 regardless of physical contact. It has long
been clear that such negligence-normally fixed by reference to applicable
navigational rules 4-may be a causative factor in a collision despite corporeal
removal of the wrongdoer, as in the infrequent case where vessel A, without
impact, crowds vessel B into collision with c,s or where a tugmaster, though
physically apart from his tow, causes it to be struck by an innocent ship. 0
The recent perfection of effective marine search radar has significantly expanded the scope of judicial inquiry in resolving problems of inter-ship
responsibility. 7 While there has not yet emerged a generic duty to utilize
1 " .•• [A libel] in personam in admiralty may be brought against the United States
. . .for damages caused by a public vessel of the United States . . . .'' 43 Stat. 1112 (1925),
46 u.s.c. (1952) §781.
2 Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United States, 324 U.S. 215 (1945).
3 Federal liability respecting the use of public vessels has apparently been extended
beyond the requirement of operation announced in Canadian Aviator, Ltd. v. United
States, note 2 supra. To the effect that mere possession is now sufficient, see Thomason
v. United States, (9th Cir. 1950) 184 F. (2d) 105.
4 ROBINSON, ADMIRALTY 796 (1939). The incident in the principal case was controlled
by the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea. Id. at 802. These
regulations, ratified by Congress in 1951 [65 Stat. 406-420 (1951), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §§144147], were originally adopted by the most recent (1948) international conference on
safety of life at sea. For a history of international cooperation regarding navigational
safety, see 1 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 8th ed., §265 et seq. (1955).
5 The Susquehanna, (E.D.N.Y. 1905) 134 F. 641; The Sisters, 1 Prob. Div. 117 (1875).
See generally, GRIFFIN, THE AMERICAN LAW OF COLLISION §223 (1949).
6 The John G. Stevens, 170 U.S. 113 (1898); Bouchard Transportation Co. v. The
Providence, (2d Cir. 1955) 223 F. (2d) 404. Cf. Compania Maritima Samsoc Limitada v.
Moran Towing & Transp. Co., (2d Cir. 1952) 197 F. (2d) 607.
7 A useful discussion of the principles, limitations, and import of modern navigational
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available radar for evasion of collision, 8 the availability of radar may affect
the duty of a commander who manifests his assumption of responsibility
for another's safe navigation. Specifically, it may be said that a radarequipped vessel which, by military relation or positive acts of intercession,
inspires justifiable reliance in a second vessel that the first will give warning in case of danger, creates in herself a duty to give such warning. 0 Thus
a convoy commodore10 or the commander of an escort vessel,11 aware of
danger to ships in his charge, is negligent if he omits giving them timely
warning of possible harm. So also where two vessels are about to cross
in a heavy fog, a third vessel which interjects a whistle signal indicating
the navigational procedure to be followed will be negligent if she then
fails to warn the crossing vessels of their dangerous proximity as it appears
on her radar.12 It is apparent that these cases represent no more than specialized applications of an established tort concept, viz., that A, having
undertaken to assist an imperiled B, must do so with reasonable care.13
The court's finding in the principal case, however, that the "special circumstances"14 and "general prudential" 10 international navigational rules imposed a legal duty on the formation commanders to caution Washington,
a vessel not in their original charge, would appear to conflict with the
radar appears in WYLIE, THE UsE OF RADAR AT SEA (1953). See also Hogan, "The Use
of Radar as a Legal Duty," The J.A.G. J., Sept. 1948, p. 3.
s Compare The Medford, (E.D.N.Y. 1946) 65 F. Supp. 622, noted in 33 VA. L. REv.
71 (1947), with British Transportation Commission v. United States, (4th Cir. 1956) 230
F. (2d) 139. See also Biesemeier and Bergs, "Some Legal Aspects of Radar Conning,"
The J.A.G. J., Dec. 1953, p. 3. To the effect that possession of radar in no way diminishes
or alters duties under the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea, see
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON SAFETY OF LIFE AT SEA, recommendation 19 (1948).
9 Such a rule is to be inferred from the decision or dicta in the following cases:
Chesapeake &: O. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., (E.D. l\Iich. 1954) 121 F. Supp. 830;
United States v. Adstratus, (2d Cir. 1951) 190 F. (2d) 883; United States v. The Australia
Star, (2d Cir. 1949) 172 F. (2d) 472, cert. den. 338 U.S. 823 (1949); Publicover v. Alcoa
S.S. Co., (2d Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 672; The Sobieski, 81 LL L. REv. 51 (1947), affd.
[1949] Prob. 313; Glaucus and City of Florence, [1948] Prob. Div. 95.
10 The Sobieski, note 9 supra; Glaucus and City of Florence, note 9 supra; Publicover
v. Alcoa S.S. Co., note 9 supra.
11 United States v. Australia Star, note 9 supra; United States v. Adstratus, note 9 supra.
12 "The Mead, having injected herself into the picture and having sounded a twoblast signal which might indicate to The Meteor that the unseen No. 12 was to pass
The Mead's starboard, was guilty of misleading The Meteor when she did not warn her
that The No. 12 was ignoring her signal and was heading into The Meteor's path."
Chesapeake &: O. Ry. Co. v. Cleveland Tankers, Inc., note 9 supra, at 834.
13 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d ed., 184 et seq. (1955).
14 "In obeying and construing these Rules due regard shall b_e had to all dangers of
navigation and collision, and to any special circumstances . . . which may render a
departure from the above Rules necessary in order to avoid immediate danger." 65 Stat.
419 (1951), 33 U.S.C. (1952) §146k.
16 "Nothing in these rules shall exonerate any vessel . . . from the consequences
. . . of the neglect of any precaution which may be required by the ordinary practice
of seamen, or by the special circumstances of the case." 65 Stat. 419 (1951), 33 U.S.C.
(1952) §147a. For a general construction of these two rules, see HILBF.RT, THE INTERNATIONAL RULES OF THE ROAD AT SEA 126 (1938).
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basic tenet of the tort principle just stated: A has no original duty, save
perhaps a moral one, to go to imperiled B's assistance, except where the
peril was created by A's antecedent misconduct. 16 It can be hypothesized (1)
by permitting Washington to enter the formation, the commanders undertook to assist her, and were then bound to exercise due care to avoid injury
to her, or (2) that by ordering Ruchamkin to station they were guilty of
prior misconduct imperiling Washington. The court is silent as to these
possibilities, however, so the decision may be construed as imputing to the
formation commanders an original duty toward a strange vessel to assist
in the latter's safe navigation. Even the potential implication of such a
legal duty should be effaced. 17 Judicially to derive consent to give warning
from acts no more indicative of consent than steaming in sea-lanes while
equipped with radar is to confuse and compound the already exacting task
of keeping one's own vessel out of harm's way.
Michael Scott

16 PROSSER, TORTS, 2d
17 Note the following

ed., 184 et seq. (1955).
statement from Biesemeier and Bergs, "Some Legal Aspects of
Radar Conning," J.A.G. J., Dec. 1958, p. 5: "Yet another element of fault was found
. . • in that there was a duty upon the escorting naval vessel to warn her charge by
signal lights, whistle signals, or radio that she was standing into danger. • • • It is the
authors' opinion that this places a serious and what could amount to an intolerable
burden on the escort."

